Radical Conceptual Scepticism About Other Minds ( from book) My aim in this essay is to resolve the conceptual problems of other minds, and in such a way as to accommodate rather than dismiss the kind of perplexity that is undiminished by solutions, this to be achieved by aligning it with an abiding sense of the ultimately mysterious. [i] Since we need the solution first in order to give shape to the mystery, let us discuss the problem. It concerns the everyday view that mental predicates are univocal irrespective of person, so that “pain”, for instance, means the same whether I say that I am in pain or that you are. This assumption of semantic identity is rejected by the radical conceptual sceptic, his basic argument running as follows: since the mental states I experience are necessarily mine, I cannot acquire the concept of a subject of consciousness other than myself. In addressing this argument, I suggest that we defer for the moment any consideration of the deeper metaphysic
